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Rhmc? 
Cet article se propose d'exarniner les causes du conflit Somalien qui a 
provoque l'exode de plus de deux millions de rkfugies. Par une approche 
historique du developpement de la tra@die, l'auteur offre une perspective 
plus complexe et tres differente de celle offerte par les medias qui se 
cantonnent dans des discussions simplistes et superficielles des symptbmes 
actuels. Pour Hassan Mohammed, les causes de la crise Somalienne sont liees 
Bun processus de desintegration de la societe civile et de ses valeurs sociales, 
culturelles et politiques, une desintegration qui resulte de quatre evhements 
historiques: le decoupage de la nation et du territoire Somalien en plusieurs 
entites; l'impact de la guerre froide; l'imposition de systemes politique, 
culture1 et educatif &rangers B la culture Somalienne; et enfin, la manipula- 
tion et l'exploitation des divisions claniques par l'elite politique afin de 
demeurer au pouvoir. 
Introduction 
The most recent and probably the larg- 
est refugee exodus in the history of the 
Horn of Africa started in Somalia in 
1988. By the end of 1992, the world had 
witnessed the ugly consequences of 
four years of civil war and famine that 
had devastated Somalia and led to the 
disintegration of the state and civil so- 
ciety. The destructive forces of war and 
famine have claimed the lives of ap- 
proximately 350,000 Somalis and sent 
more than one million refugees to 
every corner of the globe. Most of the 
refugees fled to neighbouring coun- 
tries. According to sources such as U.S. 
Committee for Refugees (1993) and 
UNHCR (1993) there were about 
400,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia in 
1992, another 320,000 in Kenya and 
approximately 85,000 hosted by tiny 
Djibouti. Another 250,000 refugees 
were dispersed in Asia, Europe and 
North America. Besides, about two 
million people were internally dis- 
placed (see Tables 1-4). 
This article discusses the causes of 
the Somali disaster from a different 
perspective than the standard main- 
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stream explanations. The severity of 
the crisis in Somalia was largely un- 
known to the outside world prior to 
the televised images of starving multi- 
tudes and marauding armed young- 
sters which attracted the world's 
attention-eventually leading to the 
now famous "Operation Restore 
Hope." But the impressions portrayed 
gave neither an accurate picture nor 
adequately explained the genesis of 
the crisis. In most cases, the causes of 
the current chaos and crises in Somalia 
have been attributed to internal fac- 
tors, such as "a senseless tribal war 
over state-control." This became the 
standard premise for most of the popu- 
lar and academic writings on the crisis 
in Somalia. 
The fixation on the immediate social 
crisis-such as lawlessness, anarchy 
and starvation-an be both mislead- 
ing and unjust. It is misleading because 
the emphasis is on the symptoms and 
not on the causes of the situation. This 
approach not only leads to inadequate 
understanding of the problems but is 
also unjust when the diagnosis prima- 
rily focuses on the single dimension of 
internal factors, while ignoring exter- 
nal and historical aspects. Such a sin- 
gle-sided approach tended "to blame 
the victims for their misery and agony" 
(Keynan 1992) and resulted in the por- 
trayal of Somalis as "either gun-crazy 
looters or as hapless victims" that 
needed to be rescued from themselves 
(Rakia 1992). 
It is unfortunate that the discourse 
on the crisis in Somalia has so far ig- 
nored the complex historical develop- 
ment of the tragedy. Abdi Samatar 
(1992, 626) aptly described the prob- 
lem: 
One of the casualties of the gruesome 
nightmare that is gripping Somalia 
has been the capacity to thinkhistori- 
cally and systematically about the 
nature of the malady, and to find 
practical ways of controlling the 
present in order to build a more sus- 
tainable future. 
The failure of "Operation Restore 
Hope" is an apt illustration of this 
point; the good intentions of the opera- 
tion made many innocent Somalis vic- 
tims rather than beneficiaries of the 
supposedly humanitarian interven- 
tion. 
To understand fully the causes of 
the crisis, it is necessary to go beyond 
the traditional scholarship which 
tends to reduce the causes to a single 
factor, namely, Somali segmentary 
clanism (Abdi Samatar 1992 and 
Keynan 1992). The causes behind the 
crisis are the result of an interplay of 
political, economic, sociocultural and 
ecological factors that have been in the 
making for a long time (Wisner 1992; 
Keynan 1992 and Abdi Samatar 1992). 
The correlations of these can be under- 
stood from a historical perspective that 
views the disintegration of indigenous 
social systems and civil society as the 
consequences of: 
1. the impact of the colonial legacy 
especially the partition of the So- 
mali nation and territories; 
2. the legacy of the Cold War; 
3. the imposition of alien centralized 
structures, systems of governance, 
culture and education which con- 
tributed to the disintegration of the 
indigenous political, economic 
and sociocultural modes of life and 
structures that were compatible 
I 
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with the harsh and precarious en- 
vironment of the Horn of Africa; 
and finally 
4. the failure of the mentally colo- 
nized ruling elite to develop viable 
alternatives to western values and 
systems of governance rather than 
resorting to the manipulation and 
exploitation of the segmentary na- 
ture of the Somali social system in 
order to stay in power. 
The Partition of the Somali Nation: 
A Colonial Legacy 
A major causal factor in the current 
crisis is the impact of the colonial par- 
tition of Somali nation into five sepa- 
rate parts: British Somaliland in the 
north; North Frontier District (NFD, 
which Britain later ceded to Kenya); 
Italian Somaliland in the south; French 
Somaliland (now Djibouti); and a large 
region known as Ogaden which all 
three European powers relinquished 
portions of to Emperor Menelik of 
Ethiopia as a reward for his collabora- 
tion (Lewis 1988; Harbeson 1991; 
Zolberg 1992 and Sheikh-Abdi 1993). 
Only two parts of the Somali nation- 
the former British Somaliland and 
former Italian Somaliland--out of five 
gained independence and united, on 
July 1,1960 to form the present Somali 
Democratic Republic. For Somalis, one 
of the most devastating results of the 
colonial .partition was that it "frus- 
trated Somqli national aspirations and 
fractured the basis for statehood laid 
by stable colonial rule elsewhere [in 
Africa]" (Harbeson 1991). Conse- ' 
quently, this legacy gave birth to 
strong sentiments of Pan-Somalism, 
whose pursuit helped precipitate spo- 
radic wars between Somalia and Ethio- 
pia. For example, the wars of 1960, 
1963-64 and 1976-78 directly contrib- 
uted to several refugee populations. 
Before we discuss Pan-So~alismlet us 
first look at the role of the superpowers 
during the Cold War era in the Horn of 
Africa. 
The Role of the Superpowers 
The proximity of the Horn of Africa to 
the Suez Canal and the oil rich Middle 
East have made it attractive to foreign 
involvement in its affairs. The United 
States and the former Soviet Union, 
driven by geopolitical and ideological 
motives, turned the Hornof Africa into 
one of the most bitterly contested bat- 
tlefields of the Cold War. Since the 
early 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  the superpowers-partly 
in response to the demands of their 
local clients-dumped massive 
amounts of deadly weapons into the 
region. 
Somalia and Ethiopia are among the 
poorest countries in the world, yet 
during the 1970s and 1980s their mili- 
tary rulers diverted tremendous 
amounts of national resources to build 
and sustain huge standing armies. One 
Somali writer, Keynan (1993) esti- 
mated that Somalia spent between 60 
and 80 percent of its annual budget on 
defense. He put the annual public ex- 
penditure per soldier at $US 2,065; 
compared to, say, the salary of $US 100 
to a senior lecturer at the Somali Na- 
tional University. The cost of soldiers 
weapons to the local people-deliv- 
ered in the form of loans and aid- 
exceeded $US 12 billion. For example, 
atfhe height of Ogaden war in "just 
five months, between November 1977 
and March 1978, the Soviet Union 
dumped $US 2 billion worth of sophis- 
ticated weaponry in the Horn (Keynan 
1992,6-7)." Today, the deadly arms in 
the hands of the Somalis that confront 
the UN multilateral military mission 
are the legacy of the Cold War (Zolberg 
1992). There is no need to elaborate the 
Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 7 
role these arms have played in Soma- 
lia's ongoing destruction and refugee 
exodus. 
Pan-Somalism: The Faded Dream 
The post-colonial regimes of Somalia 
spent considerable amounts of energy 
and resources toward unification of 
the dismembered Somali nation. Pur- 
suing this dream led to constant hos- 
tilities and open warfare between 
Somalia and the neighbouring coun- 
tries of Ethiopia and Kenya during the 
1960s. A decade later, sensing the de- 
cline of the legitimacy of their military 
rule, Siad Barre (Somalia's former dic- 
tator) and his colleagues played their 
final card-Pan-Somalism, a matter 
heavy in every Somali's heart. 
In 1975, Somalia supported the 
dominant Western Somali Liberation 
Movement (WSLF) in Ogaden (under 
Ethiopian rule) in an attempt to realize 
the dream of Somali unification. On 
July 23,1977 the Somali army entered 
Ogaden in support of WSLF. It quickly 
captured more than 95 percent of the 
Somali inhabited lands and launched 
assaults on the outskirts of Hararland 
Dira-Dawa. 
The balance of power changed 
when the former military regime in 
Ethiopia broke off relations with the 
United States. At the same time, Soma- 
lia expelled the Soviets. Viewing the 
Horn of Africa as a strategic area, the 
superpowers switched horses. The So- 
viet Union embarked on a massive air- 
lift, which the world had not 
experienced since the World War 11, to 
support the Ethiopian side and to save 
Mengistu's regime. Siad Barre was 
unable either to persuade Russia to be 
neutral or to secure western help. Con- 
sequently, Somalia lost the war to the 
forces of Ethiopia, equipped with Cu- 
ban, East German and Soviet expertise 
and technology. 
The Aftermath of Ogaden War 
The Somali rulers had disastrously 
miscalculated the whole endeavour 
and the Somali people paid a costly 
price. First, there was the unprec- 
edented flight of 1.5 million refugees 
from the vengeful re-imposition of 
Ethiopian rule in Ogaden. Second, the 
defeat had a negative psychological 
impact on the morale and self-esteem 
of the population and set the stage for 
the political disintegration of Somali 
unity. Once the last hope for Pan- 
Somalism had vanished, all- of the re- 
sources, energy and sentiments that 
had been directed toward the external 
enemies became a double edged sword 
that was now turned inward. Third, 
people could no longer endure the 
political, economic and social hard- 
ships, and openly challenged the lead- 
ership as a result. Thus, the pursuit of 
Pan-Somalism had directly contrib- 
uted to the present destruction. 
Harbeson (1991, 223), comparing the 
consequences of Ogaden war for the 
rulers of Ethiopia and Somalia, also 
contends: 
The causes of the [current] civil wars 
in Somalia are significantly different 
from those in Ethiopia. The 1977- 
1978 Ogaden war between Ethiopia 
and Somalia had failed to extend and 
escalate the ongoing Ethiopian civil 
wars and in general had helped to 
rally support for a beleaguered 
Mengistu regime. In contrast, in So- 
malia the Ogaden conflict inspired 
the civil war that was to topple the 
regime of Siad Barre more than a 
decade later. 
Finally, the defeat had widened the 
division among the ruling class that 
had already been engaged in a feud 
over the misappropriation of public 
resources and the state treasury: 
Once the new regime consolidated 
its power, which took about four to 
five years, the hard-fisted military 
bureaucracy began openly to raid the 
public coffers at an unprecedented 
rate, particularly after the Ogaden 
war of 1977-8. The defeat of the So- 
mali army added more fuel to the 
disintegration of the ruling junta and 
the armed forces (Samatar and 
Samatar 1987,683). 
The squabbling among the leader- 
ship took the form of "pitting one fac- 
tion against the other in an old and 
familiar fashion" (i.e., "clanism"; ibid, 
684). A clan-based attempted coup in 
1978 was brutally suppressed and con- 
sequently the resources of the nation 
were diverted to the diverse warring 
factions among the elite. 
Tribalism in African Social 
Systems 
Son, the tribalism business is the 
work of the urban people. They cook 
it there and then serve it to us. (Issa, 
a peasant in Jowhar, spring 1990; 
Quoted by Abdi Samatar 1992,625). 
One of the major contentions of this 
paper is that the majority of Somalis do 
not view tribalism as the cause of their 
problems but rather as the creation of 
the ruling elites. In the past, it had been 
the colonial administrations that used 
the "centrifugal tendencies" of indig- 
enous social structures as a divide and 
rule strategy to consolidate their 
power. In the pursuit of their economic 
and political interests, the post-inde- 
pendence ruling elites used tribalism 
to divide and manipulate the clan-seg- 
mented, but otherwise homogenous, 
Somali society. 
This view is not unique to the So- 
mali context; we find support from 
African scholars who argue that, in 
Africa, colonialism has created "tfibal- 
ism" in addition to nation-states. For 
example, Osaghae (1991,28) contends 
that "modern" forms of tribe and trib- 
alism are emergent social structures. 
He cites Raymond Apthorpoe who ar- 
gues that "the colonial regimes admin- 
istratively created tribes as we think of 
them today." Similarly, Ali Mazrui 
(1980) argues that the western impact 
has instilled three levels of identity 
among Africans: the identity of tribe 
tops the list followed by identities of 
nation-state and race. The point here is 
that the way tribalism is defined and 
used today evolved during the colo- 
nial era. Of course, African communi- 
ties were divided along different 
lineage and kinship structures, but the 
divisive aspects of tribalism were less 
pronounced because African societies 
had indigenous social laws and 
norms-called Xeer in the Somali con- 
text-that regulated civil society and 
ensured political stability. Hence, 
many African communities were more 
stable and harmonious than they are 
today. These systems have been mar- 
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ginalized as result of colonialism and 
western influence. 
The Indigenous Somali Social 
System: Kinship and Xeer 
For centuries the "pillar of Somali so- 
cial structure" was the communal sys- 
tem based on family and clan 
relationships and interactions (Abdi 
Samatar 1992, 629). Each basic family 
unit or household stood as an "autono- 
mous unit" in its economic produc- 
tion, yet the neighbouring groups had 
guaranteed their own physical and 
social security through formal con- 
tracts (Xeer) of alliances among men 
who calculated their loyalties to one 
another in terms of kinship. Kinship, a ' 
misunderstood concept in the case of 
Somalia, is more complex than simple 
biological relationship. A Somali 
scholar has recently described the full 
meaning of kinship in the pre-colonial 
Somali social order as follows: 
The ideology of kinship had two cen- 
tral elements: Blood-ties and Xeer. 
The first was essentially a product of 
genealogical connections buttressed 
by a patrilineal system harking back 
to real or invented common origin/ 
ancestor; the latter was the embodi- 
ment of common wisdom and the 
locus of inter/ intra generational and, 
,in its most general depiction, a Pan- 
Somali code of conduct. The com- 
bined meaning of these elements 
constituted the-&lieu in which both 
the private and the public were de- 
fined. This, then, was the basis of kin- 
ship-an ideology commensurate 
with reciprocal production relations 
(Abdi Samatar 1992,630). 
Historically, in the absence of cen- 
tralized and "institutionalized state 
structures," theXeer was a socially con- 
strueed system of norms and values 
established to ensure the security, so- 
cial justice and harmony of Somali pas- 
toral communities. The Xeer system 
was latter modified and reinforced by 
Islamic values. The role of Xeer was to 
codify the political obligations of inter- 
clan, as well as intra-clan, lineage 
mates and their followers who collabo- 
rated socially and economically to 
share certain labour tasks, to defend or 
extend grazing areas, and to redistrib- 
ute basic productive or subsistence re- 
sources to individuals in need. In this 
context, the Xeer kinship system 
served both as a cohesive and a divi- 
sive factor, depending on the dictates 
of the prevailing social, political and 
economic relations of the society-i.e., 
whether they were antagonistic or co- 
operative. The nature of these relation- 
ships were largely moderated by the 
Xeerbetween the different groups. The 
excesses of segmentary clanism were 
tamed and constrained by the obliga- 
tory values of Xeer just as western indi- 
vidualistic society is regulated by law 
and order. 
In pre-colonial Somalia this system 
was somewhat stable, Abdi Samatar 
(1992,631) described the resilience and 
viability of the pre-colonial Somali 
Xeer system as follows: 
What gave the Xeer staying power in 
the absence of centralised coercive 
machinery was the voluntarism as- 
sociated with the absolute necessity 
of relying and living on one's la- 
bour/livestock rather than exploit- 
ing others. Such an ethic-in 
conjunction with Islam-prevented 
and restrained centrifugal -tenden- 
cies in the lineage system, thereby 
inhibiting terrible men from plung- 
ing the community into a nightmare. 
With the advent of the western-style 
centralized state, the Xeer system was 
continuously undermined by super- 
seding state laws and rules. Modern 
Somali (and African) state rulers and 
elites may no longer be guided by val- 
ues based on Xeer as these were re- 
placed by foreign social values and 
systems of governance. 
The Post-Colonial Centralized State 
In most Third World countries and 
particularly Africa, the post-colonial 
ruling class inherited the colonial 
structures and its culture of state man- 
agement. This fact created a depend- 
ency relationship with former colonial 
powers which constituted not only 
economic and political but also cul- 
tural and intellectual aspects. The 
depth of such dependence was such 
that the "colonial regime was to relin- 
quish visible power but not to lose de- 
cisive influence" as Abdi Samatamnd 
Ahmed Samatar (1987, 680) put it. 
Thus, the post-colonial leaders have 
used Eurocentric colonial models in all 
aspects of governance. Michael 
Crowder also attests: 
The colonial experience has affected 
the way Africa has developed over 
the past twenty-five years ... there are 
many parallels to be found between 
the colonial state and the independ- 
ent state than are conceded (Samatar 
and Samatar 1987,680). 
In the case of Somalia, the adoption 
of British style parliamentary politics 
exemplifies the imprint of colonial her- 
itage on its disciples who came into 
power, not to mention that the consti- 
tution they were following was drafted 
by foreign experts: 
The Somali Independence Constitu- 
tion of 1960 was written by Italian 
and American experts, one of whom 
reputedly boasted of drafting the 
constitution in a Rome hotel over a 
bottle of whisky (Adam 1992,22). 
This fact illustrates the colonized 
mentality of the Somali elites which 
led to their failure to develop the coun- 
try even according to western sys- 
tems-for they were as divorced from 
the reality of the country they were 
leading as was their foreign drafted 
constitution. 
Clanism and Elite Manipulation in 
Somalia 
Some scholars perceive the Somali in- 
digenous social system as egalitarian, 
labelling it "pastoral democracy" 
(Lewis 1961; Touval1963; Laitin and 
Samatar 1987). Furthermore, they have 
suggested that a multiparty system 
would be consistent with the pastoral 
values of the Somalis. Hence, the con- 
stitution of the new Somali State, up 
until 1969, guaranteed the freedom to 
organize and compete for political of- 
fice through a multiparty western- 
style political system. But what was 
inconsistent with the pastoral ethos of 
the Somali people was the emphasis 
the new constitution placed on the in- 
dividual entity in contrast to group- 
clan-entity. There is a difference 
between the western notion of democ- 
Refuse, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 9 
racy that is based on values of indi- 
vidualistic society as compared to the 
Somali pastoral democracy that is 
based on communal social system and 
values-an aspect that has been over- 
looked. 
The failure to appreciate such dif- 
ferences led to the derailment of the 
infant parliamentary democracy and 
theemergence of clan-based political 
rivalry at the national level. The seg- 
mentary nature of Somali society be- 
came the Achilles' heel that power 
hungry elites exploited. National re- 
sources were distributed through 
clans rather than through an impartial 
merit system. Individuals were pro- 
moted on the basis of their clan ties 
rather than on their individual merit 
and proven leadership qualities. This 
practice, which was neither western 
nor indigenous but somewhat akin to 
that of colonial administration, incited 
factionalism and aggravated the "an- 
archic tendencies already present in 
the society" (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 
76). The result was chaos and the de- 
railment of the democratic process. 
There was a contradiction between 
the ideal and the practical, a lack of 
integrity on the part of the leaders and 
a confusion in the Somali psyche. A 
double standard of moral norms de- 
veloped and was internalized to the 
extent that the Somali individual, on 
the one hand, publicly abhors clanism, 
and on the other, privately relies on it 
to attain personal ends. Somali psy- 
chiatrist, Hussein Bulhan (1992, 13) 
describes this phenomenon as follows: 
Few things reveal the social neurosis 
of the westernized Somali as the in- 
congruence of what he declares in 
public versus what he acts upon in 
the privacy of his clan. 
Siad Barre, an ex-officer of the colonial 
army and a shrewd player of Somali 
clan politics, exploited this phenom- 
ena to prolong his rule for more than 
two decades. With the help of state 
treasury he courted the loyalties of clan 
leaders and played them off against 
each other-to the point of supplying 
funds and ammunition to opposing 
groups. Those who opposed Barre 
played the same game as he did. Sub- 
sequent challenges to his leadership 
were invariably organizationally clan- 
based. Trust rather than ideas or ideol- 
ogy became the determining factor in 
political alliances. 
Eventually, in late 1990, Barre's not- 
so-secret practice of divide and rule 
broke down. At home he simply ran 
out of clans: the Ogadens; the largest 
and vital Hawiye; and even the quiet 
and peaceful Rahanwayn deserted 
him. Finally, the USC (mainly consti- 
tuted of Hawiye clans) with the help of 
others overran Barre's palace in early 
January 1991. But instead of sharing 
the leadership, the factional leaders 
fought over it, fuelling a new inter-clan 
civil war that killed more than 350,000 
Somalis and scattered two million 
refugees around the globe. 
Conclusion 
There is no denial that it is Somalis 
who are killing each other in clan- 
based conflict. However, to focus 
solely on clanism is overly simplistic 
and gives a misleading explanation of 
the causes of the present crisis. The real 
causes of civil conflict in Somalia lie 
less with the nature of clan segrnenta- 
tion and more with the impact of the 
partition of the Somali nation; the ma- 
nipulation by the ruling elites of the 
Somali segmentary social system; the 
marginalization of the indigenous so- 
cial system (Xeer); and the inadequacy 
of the mediating role of the rulers and 
the state mechanisms that replaced it. 
It is the combination of the above fac- 
tors that led to the destruction of the 
country and the fabric of the Somali 
nation. 
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